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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITYOFOREM, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 20040179-CA 
v. : 
RAJIBARBIR, : 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3. Addendum [hereinafter "Add."]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure the City of Orem 
respectfully prays the Utah Court of Appeals certify this appeal to tl;> - ;.i>i NI;=-I'VI" •' >nrt 
to review State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) and State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 
911,916 (Utah 1998) rulings and entertain the City of Orem's request to overrule Viles and 
Heaton and interpret Utah Code Ann.§77-29-l,et seq., in conjunction with Utah Code 
Ann.§77-29-5, et seq., and in light of the ruling inFex v. Michigan. (1993). 507 U.S. 43.113 
S.Ct. 1085, Croslandv. State, 219 Utah Adv. Rep.3, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), and State 
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 311 (Utahl975), and upon statutory construction and policy to 
eliminate the two created different sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy 
disposition periods for prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the same system. 
2. In the alternative, the City of Orem prays the Utah Court of Appeals provide for 
a "good cause" exception as listed under §77-29-1(2)-(3) by affirming that the "appropriate 
prosecuting" attorney must receive actual notice, not constructive notice, and reinstate the 
charges against the defendant. The City contends the Trial Court incorrectly ruled and 
dismissed the charges against the appellee, pursuant to Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1, that 
the City of Orem had constructive notice upon receipt by the warden/prison of the 120-day 
written demand by the appellee to have his case(s), pending in Orem City and other 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, "Good Cause" exists to extend and conduct the trial outside of 
the 120-day requirement. Accordingly, this Court should review the trial court's 
"constructive notice" finding for correction. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 
1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL: PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
See addendum for copies of all pertinent provisions, statutes and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 5, 2001, Orem City filed and charged, in the Fourth District Court 
Orem department, the Appellee with driving on revocation, open container, and five 
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misdemeanor couiits of possession of a controlled substance. The trial coi irt judge recused 
himself because of a conflict of interest and the case was transferred to the Frovo Depai11nent 
and Judge Davis was assigned. Judge Davis issued a bench warrant for the defendants arrest 
on April 19, 2002 for failing to appear at the pretrial conference. On or about August 19, 
2002, the defendant was arrested on the warrant. The City of Orem did not receive notice 
of the defendants arrest on the bench warrant and the defendant was sent to prison on other 
matters. 
On or about October 17, 2002, a 120-day written demand for disposition for all the 
defendant's cases were delivered to the warden. The warden failed to send I he 120 day 
disposition to Orem City. The 120-day disposition was sent to the Utah County Attorney's 
office and the Provo District court. Neither party notified Orem City of the 120-day notice 
disposition. The 120-day period expired on February 14, 2003. In April, the state prison 
mailed the Court to schedule a pretrial conference, which the Court scheduled, but the Court 
failed to send notice of this new pretrial conference to the City of Orem. The Court 
rescheduled the hearing and the defendant was again remanded back to the custody of the 
prison. 
On July 22,2003, the Court sent a new notice of a pretrial conference. The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss at this pretrial conference. The Court scheduled a trial for 
November 20,2003 and at that time would hear arguments from both sides. On November 
20, 2003, Judge Pullen granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
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The Appellant now appeals the trial courts dismissal of the case for failure to bring the 
defendant to trial prior to the 120 day expiration. Because the chronology of the proceedings 
in this matter is critical in reviewing this matter, the Statement of Facts will contain the 
chronological and procedural history. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 5, 2001, the Orem City Attorneys office filed charges, in the 
Fourth District Court, Orem Department, of five counts of possession or use 
of controlled substance, driving on revocation, and possession or 
transportation of an open container of alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle. 
(R.at 2). 
2. On November 1, 2001, the date of arraignment, Judge Backlund recused 
himself and referred the case to the Court Administrator. (R.at 4). 
3. The Court Administrator assigned the case to Judge Davis and an arraignment 
was scheduled for January 23, 2002. (R.at 4). 
4. The defendant appeared late for the arraignment, on January 23,2002, and the 
court recalled the warrant issued for failing to appear. (R.at 8). 
5. The Court appointed Randy Lish, the Orem City Public Defender, to represent 
the defendant. (R.at 8). 
6. The Court sent notices to both the Orem City Prosecutor and the Public 
Defender of the next pretrial scheduled on March 5, 2002. (R.at 6-8). 
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Ofi March 5,2005, both parties requested a continuance of the pretrial and the 
court granted the motion scheduling the next pretrial conference on A pr11 30, 
2002. (R.at 13,14). 
The defendant failed to appear on April 30, 2002, and Judge Davis issued a 
$2,500, cash only bench warrant. (R.at 16 
On August 19, 2002, the Defendant was arrested on the bench warrant. (R.at 
77,15). 
The Orem City Attorney' s office was never notified the defendant was arrested 
on the Bench warrant. (R.at 75, f20). 
On September 6,2002, the Defendant was sent to the Utah State Prison. (R.at 
76,112). 
On September 25, 2002, the defendant filed with the division of institutional 
operations a notice and request for 120-day disposition of pending charges. 
(R.at 30-33). 
The Defendant listed on the "Division of Institutional Operations Office 
Memorandum," the prosecuting agencies as "Utah County, Orem City, and 
Pleasant Grove." (R.at 30-33). 
On the "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charge(s)" the 
defendant requested final disposition of "Possession of Controlled Substance 
case #9850403 88" pending against "me" in the "Provo District" Court brought 
5 
by "Utah County55 prosecuting agency. (R.at 31). 
15. On October 17, 2002, an authorized agent of state prison certified the notice. 
(R.at 31). 
16. The 120-day disposition began to run from October 17,2002, and would have 
expired on February 14, 2003. (R.at 75, f21). 
17. However, on October 15,2002, two days earlier, the Utah State Prison sent to 
the Utah County Attorney's officer a letter stating "Bruce Jackson is currently 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He/She is requesting disposition of 
untried charges of driving on revocation, possession of c/s 3 cts (sic), pending 
in your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his 
request.55 (R.at 34). 
18. The letter listed case numbers "985040388,985039407,985041078,027J219.55 
(R.at34). 
19. The Orem City case numbers were not included on the letter. (R.at 34). 
20. A copy of this letter was filed with the "Fourth District Court Clerk-Provo.55 
(R.at34). 
21. The Orem City Attorney's office never received any of these notices filed by 
the defendant nor had any knowledge the defendant was incarcerated. (R.at 
75,119-20). 
22. Almost one year after the bench warrant was issued, on April 23, 2003, 
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"Darlene" at the Utah State Prison e-mailed and requested a court date be set; 
this was several months after the 120-day disposition expired (H Al Mi nute 
Entry Record Page 4). 
23. The Court scheduled a pretrial conference for May 27, 2003. (R.at 22). 
24. On May 27, 2003, the Court on its own motion continued the pretrial because 
the Orem City Prosecutor was not given notice of the Mm 27, 2003 IK ,II ing. 
(R.at 22-24). 
25. The Court rescheduled the pretrial conference hearing for July 22,2003. (R.at 
24). 
26. Judge Taylor presided over the July 22, 2003 pretrial hearin<» tin I llie 
defendant's attorney requested this case be scheduled for a Motion hearing 
regarding a Motion to dismiss. (R.at 26-28). 
27. The motion hearing was scheduled for September 29, 2003 (R.at26). 
28. On September 10, 2003, the defendant filed Motion JIKI MnnoMiidum to 
dismiss the case. (R.at 42-44). 
29. On September 29, 2003, the defendant's attorney stated he wishes to proceed 
to trial in case #014404844 and the Court set both oral argument and the date 
for trial on November 20,2003. However, the issue of whether the defendant 
would be forced to go to trial would be contingent upon the court granting or 
denying his motion to dismiss. (R.at 43-44). 
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30. On November 20,2003, prior to the trial, Judge Derek Pullan presided over the 
hearing and the Court heard Oral Arguments from both the defendant and the 
City. (R.at45;Tr. Volume I of I, Pg. 14-45) 
31. At the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Court dismissed with prejudice all 
counts against the defendant based upon the defendant's motion and oral 
arguments. (R.at 45-47; Tr.Volume I ofIPg.42, TJ10-23.) 
32. Mr. Lish prepared the findings of facts and conclusions of law, but the Court 
disagreed and prepared its own facts and legal conclusions. (R.at 70-78). 
33. In the findings of fact, the Trial Court acknowledged the City did not receive 
notice of the defendant being picked up on the bench warrant or receive notice 
of 120-day detainer notice. (R.at 75,^19,20). 
34. The City of Orem requested the Trial Court find good cause to extend and 
conduct a trial outside of the 120-day detainer statute requirement based upon 
the defendants conduct (having failed to appear at a pretrial conference and 
a bench warrant being issued) and failing to receive any notice of arrest on the 
warrant and/or the failure to receive the 120-day detainer notice demand. (R.at 
72). 
35. The Court found this argument without merit and ruled based upon State v. 
Heaton, the 120-day detainer statute requirement commenced upon the warden 
receiving the defendant's notice, and thus, the City of Orem would have 
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constructive notice of the defendant in State's ciistody and any administrative 
mistakes made by the defendant, warden, state agency; or court \\0111 ci. not 
relieve the City of their burden to bring the defendant to trial within 120-days. 
(R.at 71,72). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: The City of Orem prays this Court certify for immediate transfer for decision 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Point II: The 120-day detainer statute should not begin to run until the appropriate 
prosecuting agency receive actual notice of the 120-day demand for disposition. 
Point III: Good cause exist to schedule and hold the trial against the appellee outside 
the 120-day time period. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. PURSUANT TO RULE 43 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE THE CITY OF OREM REQUESTS THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS CERTIFYTHIS CASE FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER TO THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT FOR DETERMINATION. 
Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure the City of Orem 
requests this honorable court to certify this case for immediate transfer to the Utah Supreme 
Court for determination to review and overturn the Supreme Court's rulings in Viles and 
Heaton and interpret Utah Code Ann.§77-29- l,et seq. in conjunction with Utah Code 
Ann.§77-29-5, et seq., and in light of Fex, Crosland, Moore, and the Taylor Courts' ruling. 
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The compelling reasons of statutory construction, policy, and need to eliminate the two 
different sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy disposition periods for 
prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the same system and treat the prisoners "side-by-side" 
supports the City's request. The City brief sets forth the following analysis in support. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THE CITY OF OREM HAD 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF DEFENDANT'S ARREST AND INCARCERATION 
UPON THE DEFENDANT5 S DELIVERY TO THE WARDEN THE WRITTEN DEMAND 
FOR 120-DAY DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL MATTERS PENDING IN OREM CITY 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §77-29-1. 
The City of Orem appeals the trial courts decision to dismiss the charges against the 
defendant and argues the trial court incorrectly ruled the City of Orem had constructive 
knowledge of the defendant's incarceration, and thus, no good cause exists to extend and 
conduct the trial court date beyond the 120-day detainer statute requirement. To adequately 
argue the reasons against "constructive notice" a historical analysis and legal development 
of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 is insightful to consider. 
Article I §12 of the Utah Constitution, provides that an accused in a criminal 
prosecution shall have the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. State v. Wilson, 
22 Utah 2d 361; 453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969). In 1965, the legislature implemented that 
provision of the Constitution by adopting Chapter 65 of Title 77, entitled "Disposition of 
Detainers Against Prisoners." Id at 159. The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutes 
stating "the purpose of these statutes is to carry into effect the constitutional guarantee of a 
speedy trial and to more precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial" as the term is used 
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in the constitutions of the various states. Id at 159. The Utah Supreme Court offers two 
judicial interpretations of these statutes; first, to prevent those charged with enforcement of 
criminal statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of charges against him, 
and second, the statute was intended to provide for the trial of charges against an accused 
while witnesses are available and their memories fresh. Id at 15 9. Moreover, as early as 1969, 
the burden of complying with the statute was placed upon the prosecutor. Id at 159. 
However, it did not take long for the Utah Courts to be faced with the challenge and 
issue of determining when the burden begins to run against the prosecution. At the time 
these issues surfaced, the Utah Code Ann. §77-65-l(a)(b) in part, provided: 
"...whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or 
correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of 
the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, 
information or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within ninety days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the county 
attorney of the county in which the indictment, information or complaint is 
pending and the appropriate court written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information or complaint.... 
(b) the written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph 
(a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, sheriff or other 
official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with 
the certificate to the appropriate county attorney and court by registered or 
certified mail, return receipt requested."(emphasis added). 
In State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 311 (Utahl975), the Court answered this specific 
issue of determining the "commencement of the period of computation, under the statute" 
by explaining and setting forth the "sequence of events to invoke the benefits of the act." 
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538 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1975); See State v.Moore. 521 P.2d 566,557 (Utah 1974)(holding 
"after further consideration and examination of the statute we conclude that the 90-day period 
commences on the day the defendant notified the county attorney of his request for final 
disposition of a case..."). The Court noted "First, the person incarcerated must give or send 
to the warden his written notice or request for final disposition. Second, the warden in 
mandatory terms is required to prepare a certificate setting forth the particulars specified in 
subsection (a)." Id at 312 (emphasis added). The Court ruled, by combining subpart (a) and 
subpart (b), the "statute provides that the request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a 
certificate of the warden, and that these "shall promptly " be forwarded to the county attorney 
and the appropriate court." Id at 312. The Court continued stating "[t]his mandatory 
language plainly requires delivery to the proper court, and carries with it the concomitant 
duty to diligently determine proper delivery... [and].. .since by the terms of the statute both the 
notice and the certificate are required, the act of giving or sending notice and the warden's 
certificate must be delivered to the county attorney and the appropriate court, before the 90-
day period commences to run." Id at 312-13. The Utah Supreme Court thus ruled that actual 
delivery to the appropriate county attorney and appropriate court were prerequisites prior to 
the commencement of the statute time frame, (emphasis added.) 
Parallel to this statute, and germane to the City's argument, is the legislative adoption 
of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 Article III, referred to as the "Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
Agreement" or "IAD." This statute is made applicable to defendant's incarcerated in 
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jurisdictions outside the state of Utah. Procedurally mirroring the Utah Code Ann. §77-65-
l(a)(b), Utah's IAD statute states "(a)...he (the incarcerated person) shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the 
appropriate court...and...(b) the written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of 
corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together 
with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified 
mail, return receipt requested. 
Similar to the Taylor Court addressing commencement of the period under Utah Code 
Ann. §77-65-l(a)-(b), the Utah Supreme Court faced the issue of determining when the 
burden on the prosecutor should commence under the "IAD"- whether upon delivery to the 
warden or upon delivery to the appropriate prosecuting agency. In Croslandv. State, 219 
Utah Adv. Rep.3, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court considered this issue 
when a Utah Prosecutor did not receive the notice sent by an incarcerated detainee located 
in the state of Idaho. The detainee argued he complied with the IAD by delivering the 
written demand to the Idaho custodians and that the IAD protections are immediately 
invoked because he has done all he can under the statute, and thus, the Utah authorities had 
"de facto notice" of his desire to dispose of the Utah charges pending against him. The Utah 
Supreme Court relied upon a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling ofFexv. Michigan (1993), 
507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, because the "IAD" is a congressionally sanctioned interstate 
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compact [and] the interpretation of which presents a question of federal law. Crosland v. 
State. 219 Utah Adv. Rep.3, 857 P.2d 943, 945 n.3 (Utah 1993). The Crosland Court held 
the statute only begins to run when the prosecutor receives the actual notice, not de facto 
notice, of the written demand. See Id at 943. 
The Crosland Court reached its decision based upon the U.S. Supreme Court of Fex, 
where a prisoner, being held in Indiana, was under a detainer for charges pending in 
Michigan. He gave his request for final disposition of detainer to the Indiana authorities and 
the prison officials had held the request and the Michigan prosecutor did not receive the 
request until 19 days later. Crosland v. State, at 946; Fex v. Michigan/19931 507 U.S. 43, 
113 S.Ct. 1085. The trial began one hundred seventy-seven days after the prosecutor 
received the IAD request. Id at 946. The inmate argued that the one-hundred-eighty-day 
period began to run when he submitted the request to the prison officials. Id at 946. Fex also 
advanced a policy argument, similar to Crosland's, based on the IAD's emphasis on the 
protections of prisoner's rights. Id at 946. Fex asserted that "fairness requires the burden of 
compliance with the requirements of the IAD to be placed entirely on the law enforcement 
officials involved, since the prisoner has little ability to enforce compliance" and that other 
approaches would "frustrate the [IAD's] higher purpose." Id at 946. 
The holding in Fex addressed both issues; 1) which event triggers the one-hundred-
eighty-day period-receipt by the custodial officials or receipt by the prosecuting attorney, and 
2) the policy argument of fairness and compliance enforcement. After a intensely focused 
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examination of the statutory language (read and applied as a whole), the Fex Court held 
"[indications in the text of Article III confirm, in our view, that the receiving State's receipt 
of the request starts the clock. The most significant is the provision of Article 111(b) 
requiring the warden to forward the prisoner's request and accompanying documents 'by 
registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested.5 The IAD thus provides for 
documentary evidence of the date on which the request is delivered to the officials of the 
receiving state, but requires no record of the date on which it is transmitted to the 
warden...[and]...another textual tool, we think, is the IAD's apparent indifference as to the 
manner of transmittal to the warden: Article 111(b) says only that the request 'shall be given 
or sent by the prisoner to the warden.'" Croslandv. State, at 946; Fex v. Michigan,(1993), 
113 S.Ct. at 1091.(emphasis added). 
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to address the fairness factor and the risk of the 
malfeasance, or even malicious acts, of the prison officials must be borne by the defendant, 
People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998), stating the petitioners arguments of 
fairness "are more appropriately addressed to the legislatures and the contracting states, 
which adopted the IAD's text" Fex v. Michigan^ 19931 113 S.Ct. at 1091, and as a policy 
concern, a receiving state's prosecutors should not bear the "risk of losing their case until 
they have been informed of the request for trial." Fex v. Michigan^ 1993), 113 S.Ct. at 1091. 
Moreover, the Fex Court addressed the "malicious, careless, and negligent-warden 
argument" by explaining "the IAD unquestionably requires delivery, and only after that has 
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occurred can one entertain the possibility of counting the 180 days from the transmittal to the 
warden...[and]..the careless or malicious warden, under the petitioner's interpretation, may 
be unable to delay commencement of the 180-day period, but can prevent it entirely, by 
simply failing to forward the request." Id at 1091. The Court continued "more importantly, 
however, the worst-case scenario under petitioner's interpretation produces results that are 
significantly worse: If, through negligence of the warden, a prisoner's IAD request is 
delivered to the prosecutor more than 180 days after it was transmitted to the warden, the 
prosecution will be precluded before the prosecutor even knows it has been requested. It is 
possible, though by no means certain, that this consequence could be avoided by the 
receiving state court's invocation of the "good-cause continuance" clause of Article 
III(a)-but it seems to us implausible that such a plainly undesirable result was meant to be 
avoided only by resort to the (largely discretionary) application of that provision. It is more 
reasonable to think that the receiving State's prosecutors are in no risk of losing their case 
until they have been informed of the request for trial." Fexv. Michigan/1993), 113 S.Ct. 
at 1090. 
Upon this premise, the Crosland Court ruled "the 180-day period could not have 
begun until Utah authorities actually received Crosland's request and received notice that 
there was a valid request for trial...[and]...[s]ince the circuit court and the district court 
properly concluded that none of Crosland's requests were delivered, we deny Crosland's 
petition for a writ of mandamus." Crosland v. State, at 946. 
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Returning now to the "Intrastate Detainer Statute," in 1980 the Utah Legislature 
repealed in Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, and replaced them with Chapters 1 to 34. See Utah 
Code Ann. §77-29-1. Thus, the prisoners "Intrastate detainer statute" became Utah Code 
Ann. §77-29-1 which states: 
"(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending 
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the 
prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, 
or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature 
of the charge and the court where it is pending and requesting disposition of 
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt fo the demand 
described in Subsection( 1), shall immediately cause the demand to forwarded 
by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney or clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the 
attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the 
demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause, whether previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice." (Emphasis added). 
The new legislation did alter the language in the statute, yet still required the same 
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procedural requirements. Yet, it was clear, prior to 1980, that under the Utah's "Intrastate 
Detainer Statute" the commencement of the 120-day detainer statute did not begin to run 
until the prosecuting agency and the court received notice of the written demand and this 
same interpretation is still true, as of today, for the sister-legislation of Utah's "Interstate 
Detainer Statute." 
Beginning in 1985, a gradual deviation from these previously stated majority views 
altered and changed the procedural interpretation only for a Utah "Intrastate Detainee," yet 
maintained and emphasized the statutes policy concerns of the Utah's "Intrastate" detainer 
statute's as originally ruled upon under §77-65-1. This altered interpretation began in the per 
curium decision of State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985). In Viles, the defendant 
appealed from a judgment conviction from a trial held outside of the 120-day period. The 
defendant was incarcerated and retained an attorney on his pending charges. On May 30, 
1984, the defendant delivered his notice and request for disposition of the pending charges. 
However, he argued on appeal that his attorney's filing of the notice of appearance, which 
occurred previous to May 30, constituted notice provided in section 77-29-1 and his trial was 
not held for 150 days from that filing. 
In a brief opinion, the Viles Court cites the Taylor Court and State v. Valasquez, 641 
P.2d 115 (Utah 1982), indicating the same purpose of the former statute exists under section 
77-29-1 stating "the purpose of the statute is to protect the constitutional right of prisoners 
to a speedy trial and to compel law enforcement authorities to promptly prosecute charges 
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against prisoner" and "the statutory scheme represents a legislative expression of the time 
limits that constitute a speedy public trial under the Utah Constitution" and "the 120 day 
period commences to run from the date of delivery of the written notice." State v. Viles, at 
1176. While relying on the Taylor Court for statutory purpose and policy, the Viles Court, 
without any legislative interpretation analysis, nor explaining the interrelation, if any, to §77-
29-1(1) and (2), indirectly deviated from the procedural ruling in Taylor and ruled "§77-29-1 
places the burden on the prisoner to give notice to the warden before he is entitled to have 
the charge disposed of within the statutory period of time." The Viles Court then simply 
computed the 120-days beginning on March 30, 1984 when the defendant delivered the 
notice to the warden. 
Subsequently, in State v. Heaton, where the prosecutor and court received notice, but 
then transferred to another court and a trial was never scheduled until after 120 days began 
to run, the Court, relying upon Viles, stated "the detainer statute clearly provides that the 
120-day period commences on the date the written delivery is delivered "to the warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or appropriate agent of the same." 958 P.2d 911,916 
(Utah 1998); Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1. Therefore, the Heaton Court concluded 
"administrative mistakes" do not constitute good cause "because to hold that good cause is 
supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor could contradict 
the language in section 77-29-1 (4) which places the burden of complying with the statute on 
the prosecution." Id at 915. 
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Like the Viles Court, the Heaton Court fails to explain the significance, relationship, 
applicability, if any, and/or the statutory construction of the language of §77-29-1(1) to §77-
29-1(2) and the relationship of §77-29-1 to §77-29-5. Rather, the Heaton Court merely 
commutes the 120-day time period from the date the warden received the written demand by 
relying on Viles, without any mention to the Taylor Court's contrary procedural ruling of 
§77-29-lfs predecessor statute of §77-65-1. See Id at 916. Ironically enough though, the 
Heaton Court does rely on pre-§77-29-l case law by determining the burden of compliance 
was on the prosecution by applying the Wilson Court's holding and then applies Wilson to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) as it related to subsection (1). 
Therefore, it is ironically clear that these cases fail to maintain a procedural 
consistency in commencement of the statute by applying case law interpretation for §77-65-
1 to support policy issues and compliance under §77-29-1, but fail to apply these same cases, 
as they relate to actual notice and delivery to the appropriate prosecuting attorney as required 
under §77-29-l(2)-(3) and its sister legislation of §77-29-5. Moreover, in light of §77-29-5 
and the Crosland Court, such legal holdings have created two systems for speedy trial 
resolutions under the same Utah system. Additionally, because the Speedy trial right is 
constitutionally based, the Viles and Heaton Courts interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §77-
29-1, without interpreting the statute as a whole and with other sections, chapters, and in light 
of Taylor, Crosland, and Fex, provides for an unequal application of constitutional rights 
between intrastate and interstate detainers through a creation of two separate systems 
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through judicial interpretation, because both §77-29-1 and §77-29-5 are both statutorily 
created and therefore should provide the same protections under the Federal and Utah State 
Constitution as they apply to speedy trial rights. 
Also, it is also relevant to note that the Fex and Crosland Court's decisions were 
decided after Viles-Viles being decided in 1985 and Fex and Crosland both being decided 
in 1993. When the court in Viles ruled that under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 commencement 
of the statute begins when the Warden/prison receives the written demand for disposition the 
court did not have the privilege of reviewing the Fex and Crosland courts rulings to generate 
statutory harmony between §77-29-1 and §77-29-5 so as to treat prisoners under the same 
system "side by side." Yet, the Crosland Court's decision reflects the judicial interpretation 
and application of Fex because the IAD is a u;congressionally sanctioned interstate compact 
the interpretation of which presents a question of law," Crosland v. State, at 945, and 
specifically denied Crosland's argument of de facto notice, Crosland v. State, at 946; an 
argument which the trial court in this case applied to dismiss the case against the appellee 
stating the City of Orem had Constructive notice when the Warden received the 120 day 
written notice. (R.at 71). 
In light of Crosland being decided after Viles, the following difficulties have arisen; 
First, no adequate explanation and interpretation or statutory construction exists to define the 
meaning of §77-29-1, particularly between subpart (1) and (2) and how they relate to §77-29-
5, and second, because Crosland interpreted §77-29-5 in light of Fex, the Court has created 
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tension and confusion between §77-29-1, the Utah "Intrastate Detainer Statute," and §77-29-
5, the Utah "Interstate Detainer Statute," by applying different rules to an interstate detainee 
as compared to an interstate detainee. Because the Viles court deviated from Taylor in ruling 
commencement of the statute for intrastate detainees begins upon receipt by the 
Warden/prison, and subsequent to Viles, the Crosland Court concluded that commencement 
for interstate detainees begins when the appropriate prosecutor receives notice , the Utah 
Supreme Court has created two different sets of rules governing the commencement of 
speedy disposition periods for prisoners in the same system under the same Federal and Utah 
State Constitutions governing speedy trial rights. 
By adhering to Fex and applying federal interpretation to §77-29-5 the Utah Supreme 
Court indirectly created disharmony, contusion, and an unequal application of law as to 
intrastate detainee's when it ruled in Crosland. The Crosland Court did not have the luxury 
of applying the Viles Court's holding under the judicial tool of stare decisis because 
application of federal law mandated a ruling contrary to Viles as it applied to §77-29-1. 
Yet the purpose and policy behind both statutes is to "encourage the expeditious and orderly 
disposition of charges [outstanding against a prisoner], Crosland v. State, at 946, and "the 
purpose of these statutes is to carry into effect the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial 
and to more precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial" as the term is used in the 
constitutions of the various states. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361; 453 P.2d 158, 159 
(Utah 1969). However, since Crosland there exists two separate rules for detainees both 
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of which are under the same system yet depending on whether a prisoner is an interstate or 
intrastate detainee determines when commencement of the statute begins. 
Therefore, the City of Orem requests the Court of Appeals certify this case to the Utah 
Supreme Court for the purpose of the Utah Supreme Court to review the Viles and Heaton 
Court's ruling and entertain the City of Orem's request to overrule Viles and Heaton and 
conform to the Taylor, Moore, Crosland, and the Fex Courts' ruling based upon statutory 
construction, policy, and to eliminate the two created different sets of rules governing the 
commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the 
same system. 
B. FAILURE TO COMMENCE COMPUTATION OF THE 120 DAY DETAINER 
NOTICE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 UPON ACTUAL NOTICE BY THE 
APPROPRIATE PROSECUTOR AND FAILING TO READ UTAH CODE ANN.§77-29-l 
AS A WHOLE AND ITS PROVISIONS INTERPRETED IN HARMONY WITH OTHER 
PROVISIONS OF THE SAME STATUTE AND WITH OTHER STATUTES UNDER THE 
SAME, RELATED CHAPTER CREATES AN UNEQUAL APPLICATION OF LAW 
BETWEEN INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE DETAINEES. 
In reviewing the trial court's application of section 77-29-1, the Utah Courts of 
Appeal will apply long-standing rules of statutory construction, State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT 
App 379, f 17,18 P.3d 504, and statutory construction is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). The 
Courts primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent. 
State v. Lindsay, atfl7:GohlervWood. 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). When examining 
a statute, the Court will look to its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's 
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intent and purpose in passing the statute. See Id at J^17; See Perrine v.Kennecott Mining 
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Therefore, where the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, the Court will not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine 
legislative intent. See Id at [^17; Horton v."Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 
(Utah 1991)(citation omitted). The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and 
its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and "with 
other statutes under the same and related chapters "Id at f 17(emphasis added); Roberts v. 
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643,644 (Utah 1993)(per curium)(citation omitted). Furthermore, where 
possible, the Courts will construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their 
terms. Id at |17: Schultz v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108. 1112 (Utah 1991). 
Giving full effect to the language of subsections (1 )-(4), and reading them in harmony 
with each other and Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5, it is apparent the commencement of the 120-
day statute should begin to run upon receipt by the "appropriate prosecutor" and the court. 
In review of Viles and the Heaton Court decisions, it is clear those decisions do not give 
adequate legislative interpretation and fail to give full effect to the language of subpart (1)-
(4), thereby creating a harmonious reading with the entire statute of §77-29-1, and especially 
as it relates to §77-29-5. 
Standing alone, §77-29-1(1) could arguably be interpreted as requiring delivery to the 
warden to commence the 120-day requirement, but, even so, nowhere in subsection (1) does 
the statute state commencement shall begin to run when he warden receives the notice, 
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rather, it only states the defendant is entitled to have the charge brought to trial "within 120-
days of delivery of written notice"and subsection (3) only refers back to delivery as required 
under subsection (1). See Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(1) and (3). The statute fails to state 
specifically that for commencement of the statute to begin delivery is required only to the 
warden and not to the prosecutor, albeit it may inferred from the text. However, this narrow 
approach and interpretation renders parts or words in §77-29-1(2), requiring the mandatory 
delivery by the warden to the appropriate prosecutor, inoperative and superfluous. See State 
v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995). Moreover, such reading violates the Cardinal rule 
that "the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the 
parts be interpreted as the subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object, Miller v. 
Weaver. 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592; Faux v. Mickelsen. 725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 
1986)(quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §46:05 (4th ed. 
1998), because "a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by 
one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in 
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole." Id at f 17; 
quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §96:05 (4th ed. 1998)."Id 
at 1|17. 
Simply focusing on subsection (1) of the statute without reading and interpreting the 
entire section as a whole and in conjunction with §77-29-5 creates disharmony between the 
sections and related statutes while establishing two different sets of rules governing the 
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commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the 
same system. Prior to Viles, consistency existed under each statute and section, while 
maintaining a singular set of rules under the same Utah system. Clearly "consistency seems 
more desirable in this context than confusion/' State v. Morris, 126 Wn.2d 306, 892 P.2d 
734, 737 (Wash. 1995), and there is "no utility in a potentially confusing situation" in 
creating two different means of measuring the commencement of the speedy disposition 
period" for prisoners under the same Utah system, only distinguished by whether or not 
incarceration is in or out of state. See Id at 737. 
This dilemma also occurred in the State of Washington in State v. Morris, 126 Wn.2d 
306, 892 P.2d 734,737 (Wash. 1995). In Moms, the Defendant was charged with theft and 
while incarcerated filed with the prison warden a request for speedy disposition of the theft 
charge. The request was forwarded to prosecutor and the court, but he argued on appeal that 
the time began to run under the intrastate detainer statute when the warden received the 
notice, not when the prosecuting attorney and court received the notice. (It should be noted 
that Washington's statute for Intrastate detainers parallels the language of the "Interstate 
Detainer Statute or IAD. It is also similar to Utah's previous Intrastate statute and current 
Interstate Detainer statute.") 
On appeal to the Washington Court of Appeal, the Court agreed with the defendant 
by relying on the minority opinion in Fex. The Court of Appeals stressed the analysis ofFex 
is persuasive, but not controlling authority for the interpretation of similarly worded 
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Washington States Intrastate detainer statute, and based on the dissent in Fex, ruled th^ focus 
of the statute of the relevant language is on the prisoner's act, which is complete when he 
transmits his request to the warden. Id at 737(emphasis added). 
The Washington Supreme Court recognized the Court of Appeals creation of two 
different rules for prisoners held under the same system and overruled the Court of Appeals. 
Concerned for the unequal treatment amongst incarcerated prisoners, the Washington 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fex decision ultimately controls the Washington 
Interstate detainer statute, because it is federal law and pointed out "[rjegardless of how 
convincing one finds the Fex majority, its interpretation now governs the Interstate 
Agreement of Detainers for prisoners subject to the IAD in this state." Id at 737. Therefore, 
because the Fex court controls the Interstate detainer statute and that prisoners are to be 
treated equal under Washington States system, the Washington Supreme Court refused to 
adopt the multiple system created by the Court of Appeals and emphasized "prisoners subject 
to the IAD exist side by side in our state's prisons with prisoner subject: to the Washington 
intrastate detainer statute." Id at 737.(emphasis added). 
The Court continued "it is unnecessarily confusing to create two different sets of rules 
governing the commencement of speedy disposition period for prisoners in the same system." 
Id at 737. The Court reasoned that "consistency seems more desirable here than confusion." 
Id at 737. Moreover, being influenced by the Fex Court's illustration that the IAD's 
statutory language created a system to document "receipt" of the detainer by the provision 
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of Article 111(b) requiring the warden to forward the prisoner's request and accompanying 
documents 'by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested, Fex v. 
Michigan/1993), 113 S.Ct. at 1091, the Washington Supreme Court found similarly that 
under the Intrastate detainer statute "a precise measuring event is more desirable than an 
unverifiable or indeterminate one...[and]...[o]f the two different interpretations, the Fex 
majority adopts a more verifiable and easily ascertained measuring event; by return receipt, 
thus the Court held that "actual receipt by the prosecuting attorney and superior court of the 
county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is pending commences the 120-day 
period. State v. Morris, at 738. 
Upon these premises, the City of Orem requests the Utah Supreme Court review §77-
29-l(l)-(4) and §77-29-5 to reach a harmonious interpretation of these statutes and treat 
prisoners under both statutes equally by declaring the statute commence when the 
prosecution receives notice of the detainer statute and refuse to create two different rules 
under the same system. By Juxtaposing Utah Code §77-29-1(1) and (2) and §77-25-5Art. 
111(b), which requires "written notice and request for final disposition ...shall be given or sent 
by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court..."it is clear that the warden is only an intermediary between 
the prisoner and the prosecutor, and delivery to the prosecution and the Court is the essential 
step for the commencement of the statute. 
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Based upon these foregoing principles of judicial interpretation and case law, the City 
of Orem respectfully argues the legislature specifically intended on the "appropriate 
prosecutor" to receive actual notice, not constructive notice, to commence the preceding 
against the defendant. Utah Code Ann.§77-29-1(2). The City disagrees with the trial courts 
conclusion that the commencement of the statute began when the city received "constructive 
notice" through the state when the warden/prison received the notice. (R.at 71). 
The reading of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (2) even supports the requirement of "actual 
notice" because the warden "shall cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or 
certified mail, return receipt requested." The existence of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) 
created a system to document "receipt" of the detainer by the provision requiring the warden 
to forward the prisoner's request and accompanying documents 'by personal delivery or 
certified mail, return receipt requested," and this method is a precise measuring event more 
desirable than an unverifiable or indeterminate one, and of the two different interpretations 
it is a more verifiable and easily ascertained measuring event. Also, if the time period 
commenced and ended prior to receipt by the prosecuting attorney, as in the present case, the 
prosecutor could never request from the Warden such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as "shall be requested." and Utah Code Ann. §77-29-
1(2). 
In this case the Warden was merely neglectful in his duties although he did attempt 
to deliver the notice to the Utah County Attorney, which was never forwarded to the Orem 
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City Attorneys office. However, this was not the appropriate prosecuting agency and Utah 
Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) requires the warden to personally deliver or send via certified mail, 
return receipt requested to the appropriate prosecuting attorney. By the trial court concluding 
the City had constructive notice, the language, policy, and purpose of Utah Code §77 chapter 
29 is violated and fails to give equal protection of constitutional rights to prisoners both 
interstate and intrastate. This is evident because as an intrastate detainee, rather than an 
interstate, the trial court concluded, despite the bench warrant which the city believed was 
still active, the City had constructive notice of his arrest and incarceration when he submitted 
his request for disposition to the warden/prison. Under the same title and chapter of Utah 
Code Ann.§77-29-5, if the defendant would have been an interstate detainee he would not 
have had his case dismissed because of the Fex court and Crosland rulings that 
commencement of the time does not begin to run until receipt by the appropriate prosecuting 
attorney. Therefore, because the Fex Court is federal law and §77-29-5 is subject to such 
judicial interpretation, as illustrated in Crosland, §77-29-1 should interpreted the same and 
follow similar reasoning to provide harmony, clarity, and the equal application of law to all 
prisoners held under the same Utah system. 
In essence, the VUes, Peterson, and Heaton Court's decisions relating to 
commencement of the statutory time period, fails to give proper, clear, and exhaustive 
judicial interpretation, and simply deviated from the Taylor Courts ruling. Also, it is in 
stark contrast to the Crosland Court's interpretation of Utah IAD. Thus, the Utah Supreme 
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Court creation of two different sets of rules for prisoners under the same system results in 
disharmony between the policy, purposes, and intent of the statutes which is contrary to the 
constitutional rights of a speedy trial; for if the interstate and intrastate statute are both 
designed to precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial" as the term is used, than they 
should be interpreted in a harmonious fashion and provide the equal application to prisoners 
held under the same system. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE CITY OF OREM HAD 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE 120 DEMAND FOR DISPOSITION WHEN THE 
WARDEN FAILED TO PERSONALLY DELIVER OR SEND CERTIFIED MAIL, 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED, AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 (2). 
In Utah there are two types of notices; Actual or Constructive. Actual notice has been 
said to be of two kinds: (1) express, which includes direct information, and (2) implied, 
which is inferred from the fact that the person charged had means of knowledge which it was 
his duty to use. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. Notice §6. Thus, notice is regarded in law as actual where 
the person sought to be charged therewith either knows of the existence of the particular facts 
in question or is conscious of having the means of knowing it, even though such means may 
not be employed by him or her. See Perry v. O'Donnell 749 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th Cir. 
1984). Similar to implied actual notice is constructive notice. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. Notice §7. 
Constructive notice is a legal inference or a legal presumption of notice which may not be 
disputed or controverted. See Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 
249 U.S. 12, 63 L.Ed. 447, 39 S.Ct. 231 (1919); Hotchv. United States. 14 Alaska 594, 
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212 F.2d 280 (9 Cir. 1954). The importance of the classification of notice of this character 
arises fromm the fact that constructive notice is a legal inference, while implied actual notice 
is an inference of fact. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. Notice §7. Finally, the closely related concept of 
inquiry notice exists where a person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and 
prudent person using ordinary care to make further inquiries. Shacked v. Roger Smith 
Aircraft Sales. Inc.. F.Supp. 675, 690 (N.D. 111. 1986), affd, 841 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1988); 
see discussion at 58 Am. Jur. 2d.Notice §6 & 15 (creating a third type of notice which 
resembles both constructive and actual notice). Under this theory, a person who fails to 
diligently inquire is charged with knowledge that would have been required through such 
inquiry. 58 Am. Jur. 2d.Notice,§15. 
In Utah, Actual notice is notice which "is positively proved to have been given to a 
party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to have received personally because 
the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry." In re Discipline 
ofSonnenreick 2004 UT 3, P22; 2004 Utah LEXIS 1; Blacks Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed. 
1991). This is to be distinguished from constructive notice, where information or knowledge 
of a fact is imputed to a person by law "because he could have discovered the fact by proper 
diligence, and his situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiry into it." In re 
Discipline of Sonnenreicbu 2004 UT 3, P22; 2004 Utah LEXIS 1; Blacks Law Dictionary 
733 (6th ed. 1991). 
There are two types of constructive notice that are generally recognized; Utah 
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recognizes both. First American Title Insurance v. J.B. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 
1998). One kind of constructive notice is notice which result from a record or which is 
imputed by the recording statutes; and the other is notice which is presumed because of the 
fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, 
knowledge of the ultimate facts. Id at 837. The first type is evident in the Utah Recording 
Statute, which provides that documents and instruments filed with the county recorder 
pursuant to this statute "impart notice to all persons of their contents." Id at 837. Utah Case 
law also recognizes the second type of constructive notice-inquiry notice. Id at 837; See 
County Bd.of Equalization v. State Tax Common. 789P.2d291,294 (Utah 1990); Meyer v. 
General American Corp., 569P.2d 1094,1097 (Utah 1977)(stating that "constructive notice 
can occur when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to 
require further inquiry on his part"). Inquiry notice "occurs when circumstances arise that 
should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part." Meyer, 
569 P2d at 1097. In Allied Materials, the Court stated the rule of inquiry notice as follows: 
"whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for 
inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. First American Title 
Insurance v. J.B. Ranch, at 838 (Utah 1998); Salt Lake. Garfield & W.Rv. v. Allied 
Materials Co.. 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 883, (1995). When a person has sufficient 
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it." Id at 838. 
Based upon such legal reasoning and explanation of actual and constructive notice, 
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the City of Orem appeals the courts finding of "constructive notice" for two reasons; first, 
the plain language of the statute of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) prohibits "constructive 
notice"and second, even if this Court finds the plain language of the statute allows for 
constructive notice, the failure to receive notice of the defendant's arrest (facts which the trial 
court considered irrelevant) and the 120-day written demand for disposition of pending cases, 
certainly proves the city did not receive "notice enough to excite attention and put the City 
on guard and call for inquiry and lead the City to a fact (incarceration and the existence of 
the 120-day demand), to be deemed conversant of it. 
A review of the plain language of the statute, and applying the provisions interpreted 
in harmony with other provisions in the statute, indicates the Trial Court erred in reaching 
a conclusion of imputing "Constructive Knowledge" to the City when the warden receive the 
written demand of the 120-day request for disposition of pending charges. First, Utah Code 
Ann §77-29-1(2) requires strict compliance of delivery of the 120-demand to the appropriate 
prosecuting agency. It states the "warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the 
demand described in Subsection(l), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded 
by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney or clerk." This requirement of personal delivery or certified delivery, 
return receipt requested, is actual notice which is positively proved to have been given to a 
party directly and personally. See In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, at P22. In State v 
Peterson, the Court recognizes this mandatory language by stating "Section 77-29-1(2) 
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requires that any custodial officer, upon receipt of a notice of disposit ion, "shall immediately 
cause the demand to be forwarded... to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and clerk." State 
v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). 
By imputing "constructive knowledge" of the defendant's incarceration and arrest 
through delivery of the written demand as laid out in Utah Code. Ann §77-29-1(1), and thus 
refusing to find "good cause," the Court fails to give meaning to Utah Code. Ann §77-29-
1(2) and renders it ineffective and meaningless. When the Utah Supreme Court ruled in 
Peterson and Heaton "It is apparent that the legislature intended to place the burden of 
compliance of the statute on the prosecutor," State v. Petersen, at 424, and "the mere fact 
that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor has never been considered dispositive 
because 'to hold that good cause is supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused 
by the prosecutor would contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4), which places the 
burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution'"State v. Heaton, at 915, it is 
important to note both Courts fail to mention, address, and entirely leave out any remedy for 
noncompliance with Utah Code. Ann §77-29-1(2). Yet, by placing the burden on the 
prosecutor upon delivery of the 120-day demand for disposition without allowing for "good 
cause" for a custodial official failing to comply with Utah Code. Ann §77-29-1(2) the 
"shall" language is rendered ineffective and meaningless. For this very reason Heaton must 
be narrowly construed to restrict Courts from finding "good cause" only when the 
prosecution has received actual notice (as required by Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2)) 
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coupled with neglecting the notice and the affirmative duty through inaction of bringing the 
defendant to trial within 120 day, even for administrative errors of the court or other state 
agencies. 
Even a review of section §77-29-1(4) supports narrowly restricting Heaton's ruling 
to inaction of the prosecutor only after receiving actual notice by stating "in the event the 
charge is not brought to trial within 120 days.. .the court will determine if' good cause' exists 
to allow for the trial to be held outside the 120-day requirement. Utah Code. Ann §77-29-
1(4). Such language provides an exception to the heavy burden placed upon prosecutors. 
In this case, the custodial officer, court, and defendant failed to deliver any notice of 
the 120-day notice for disposition of pending charges in Orem city or give notice of the 
defendants arrest. The City was unaware the defendant was picked up on the bench warrant 
and incarcerated. Even assuming constructive notice may be imputed to the city, failure to 
receive notice of either the arrest on the bench warrant or the 120-day detainer request, as 
required by Utah Code Ann. Section 77-29-1(2), does not give the City enough notice to 
excite attention and put the City on guard and call for inquiry, thus giving notice of 
everything to which such inquiry might have led. Moreover, failing to receive notice of 
arrest or the 120-day notice is insufficient to lead the City to a fact (the filing of the 120-day 
detainer notice) to deem the city conversant of it. The Trial Court points to no facts or 
circumstances that arise to put a reasonable person (the City) on guard so as to require further 
inquiry. There must be more than the mere arrest or delivery of the 120-day notice demand 
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to the warden as required by section §77-29-1(1) so as to put the city on notice. 
It is clear from the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) the legislature 
intended the appropriate prosecution agency to receive "actual delivery" to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and clerk, thereby giving actual notice-not constructive notice. Such 
reasoning is consistent with State v. Wells, 110 Ohio App.3d 275; 673 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio 
App. 1996). In Wells, the defendant was indicted on seven criminal counts and imprisoned 
in California on unrelated convictions. The defendant mailed a request for speedy trial, 
pursuant to Article 111(a) of the "Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), to the County 
Prosecutor. However, the postal service misdelivered his request to the City Attorney's 
office. The defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment, arguing he had not been 
brought to trial within 180 days of delivery of his request as required by the IAD. 
The trial Court denied the motion and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals 
ruled "the appellant had made out a prima facia case of actual delivery to the Franklin 
County Prosecutor by the fact that his IAD request was sent by certified mail, return receipt 
requested...however, because the prosecution claimed that the individual whose signature 
appears on the return receipt had never been employed by the Franklin County Prosecutor" 
the case was again remanded to allow the prosecution to substantiate its claim of 
nondelivery. State v. Wells. 110 Ohio App.3d 275, 277-78; 673 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio App. 
1996). The trial court then found the Franklin County Prosecutor's office did not have actual 
or constructive notice of appellant's demand for prompt disposition of charges pending. Id 
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at 278. 
The defendant appealed the second trial court ruling and argued "the Franklin County 
Prosecutor had constructive notice of the IAD request, that is, constructively took delivery 
of the request, based on the close relationship between the prosecutor and the city attorney's 
officer, and for the proposition that the city attorney's office and the Franklin County 
Prosecutor have intertwined responsibilities, are departments of a single sovereign, and 
should be bound by each other's acts and omissions." Id at 279. The defendant relied upon 
State v. Crawford. 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 107, unreported (1996 Opinions 100), to support 
his theory. 
The Ohio Interstate detainer statute stated "upon the request of a prisoner held in 
another state, the jurisdiction of that filed the detainer must bring the prisoner to trial within 
one hundred eighty days of receipt of the request... [and]... shall be brought to trial within one 
hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer 
and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place 
of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, 
information or complaint. Id at 278; R.C.2963.30, Article III(e)(emphasis added). The Ohio 
Court of Appeals ruled three things. First, Crawford did not stand for the proposition that 
every county prosecutor is bound by the acts and omissions of every political subdivision of 
the state of Ohio, because the oversight in Crawford was committed by an employee of the 
state; the oversight in this case was committed by an employee of either a municipal 
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corporation or the federal government. Id at 280. Second, the court declined to apply the 
rule of agency applicable to a state's duty under a state statute in the context of receipt of an 
IAD request when that duty does not exits under the IAD. Id at 280. Lastly, the Court ruled 
"constructive notice" or constructive delivery of the IAD request is insufficient to trigger the 
one-hundred-eighty-day speedy trial period. 
In reaching their third reason the Court relied upon Fex v. Michigan (1993), 507 U.S. 
43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1087, stating "we hold that the 180-day time period in Article 111(a) of 
the IAD does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges 
against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction 
that lodged the detainer against him." Id at 281. The holding of Fex addresses the issue of 
which event triggers the one-hundred-eighty-day period; the issue in Wells is whether that 
event has occurred. Id at 281. The Wells Court found Fex to be persuasive authority that 
constructive delivery is insufficient to trigger the one-hundred-eighty-day period in Article 
111(a) of the IAD. Id at 281. 
Both Wells and Crosland refused to apply de facto notice or constructive notice to the 
interstate detainer statute because the warden has a duty to forward and deliver to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court. Likewise, under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1, et 
seq., there exists a duty by the warden/prisoner to deliver the written notice to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court. Thus, Heaton is not applicable to this case given the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney, the City of Orem Attorney's office, did not receive actual 
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notice as required under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (2). Therefore, the City of Orem prays this 
court reinstate the charges against the defendant by overturning the trial courts ruling that the 
City of Orem had constructive notice. If the Court does not find the above reasoning 
persuasive, that commencement of statute begins upon receipt by the appropriate prosecuting 
agency, the City requests this Court find the existence of good cause to continue with the trial 
outside the 120-day disposition based upon the reasons stated, or in the alternative, to remand 
back to the trial court to determine if good cause exists when the city did not have actual 
notice. 
In addition, if this Court remands back to the trial court, the City of Orem proffers 
several factors, in addition to other factors already annunciated by the Utah Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeals that allow for good cause so as the trial court may address the fairness 
argument of neglect and delay caused by the warden/prison to determine good cause. 
Currently, most court decisions allowing for good cause reach such a conclusion because of 
some act by the defendant which hinders, delays, or thwarts the efforts of the prosecution. 
However, because the prosecution does have the strict burden of complying with the statute 
it is difficult and almost impossible to comply with the statute if a trial court concludes 
constructive notice is placed upon the prosecution but fails to grant good cause when the 
prosecution never realized or had actual notice the burden had even commenced. Thus, the 
City requests the adoption of other factors or guidelines to assist the trial court in determining 
good cause when the prosecution never receive "actual notice" of the written demand and a 
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charges could be dismissed for failure to prosecute with 120 days. This is particularly 
important and essential given certain rights afforded to victims. The dismissing of a charge 
for failure to prosecute within the 120 day time frame without finding good cause, even if 
the prosecution did not act in bad faith or negligence through inaction, may jeopardize or 
prejudice victims and create further abuse, harassment, unfairness, or disrespect to a victim 
through the dismissal of charges. Surely the rights of a victim should be considered in 
determining whether good cause exists prior to dismissal of criminal charges given the 
victims bill of rights. Therefore, the City proffers a series of other factors a trial court could 
apply to determine whether good cause exists to continue a trial beyond the 120 day period. 
They are as follows: 
1) Was the delay in bringing the defendant to trial caused by action or inaction 
of the prosecutor or the defendant? 
2) If there is further delay beyond the 120 day disposition will the defendant 
be precluded from bringing forth an adequate defense? (e.g., Are witnesses 
and evidence still available?) 
3) Was the defendant being held in prison/jail on other criminal matters which 
would not substantially harm the defendant as a result of the warden's action 
or inaction in delivery of the notice to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and 
court? 
4) Did the defendant suffer substantial, irreparable harm as a result of inaction 
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or action by the warden for failure to forward the notice to the appropriate 
prosecution agency? (e.g., was he deprived of an opportunity to obtain a 
sentence to run concurrently with a sentence being served at the time the 
detainer is filed or being ineligible to receive any type- of treatment, work 
release, transfer to a less secure living facility, etc.) 
5) If good cause is not granted to the prosecution, will the dismissal of the 
charges against the defendant result in prejudice or violation of the rights of 
a victim? (e.g., would any right granted under Utah Code Ann.§77-38 or §77-
37-3 (victims bill of rights) be prejudiced and violated as a result of the 
dismissal?) 
These factors take into consideration both the intentional and negligent conduct of the 
defendant, prosecution, and the warden/prison, while simultaneously requiring the trial court 
to consider the rights of the victim, the defendant, and the prosecuting agency. Therefore, 
the Appellant respectfully requests this court find the trial court erred in ruling that the City 
of Orem had constructive notice because Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) requires actual notice, 
and thus good cause exists to bring the defendant to trial outside the 120-day detainer 
statutory period, or in the alternative, adopt the factors provided by the City and remand back 
to the trial court to determine if good cause exists. 
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POINT II. 
FAILURE TO RECEIVE NOTICE OF THE WRITTENDEMAND FOR 120-
DAY DISPOSITION OF CASE PENDING IN OREM CITY WARRANTS 
GOOD CAUSE TO EXTEND AND CONDUCT THE TRIAL OUTSIDE OF 
THE 120-DAY REQUIREMENT. 
In the alternative, the City requests the Utah Court of Appeals clarify Viles and 
Heaton and provide for a "good cause" exception as listed under §77-29-1(2)-(3) by ruling 
the "appropriate prosecuting" attorney must receive actual notice rather than constructive 
notice. As stated above, the City's brief provides for the basis of the motion for certification 
to the Utah Supreme Court, and in the alternative, for the Utah Court of Appeal to decide the 
issues presented on Appeal. 
Despite the heavy burden placed upon prosecutors, the statute does provide for 
exceptions to the statutory requirements if good cause can be shown. The statute provides 
that "the 120-day period may be extended by either party for good cause shown in open 
court, Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(3) & (4), or by a defendant who causes a trial to be delayed. 
State v.Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,1329-30 (Utah 1986) (defendant's delay of atrial constitutes 
a temporary waiver of his right to a speedy trial); State v. Valasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 
(Utah 1982) (providing the same with respect to the 90-day disposition period under the 
former statute). 
When a trial court is asked to consider a motion to dismiss, pursuant to the detainer 
statute, it must do so under a two-step inquiry. State v. Coleman, 2001 Ut App 281, f6. 
First, the Court must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired. 
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Id at | 6 . Second, if the trial was or is going to be held outside the 120-day period, it must 
determine whether "good cause" will excuse the delay. State v. Lindsay, at ^|9; State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916. The Utah Courts have stated "good cause" that will excuse 
failure of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial within the time required means (1) 
delay caused by the defendant - - such as asking for a continuance, or (2) a relatively short 
delay caused by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial. State v. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281,1J6 , 34 P.3d 790.; quoting State v. Peterson. 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 
1991) 
In this case the trial court found that the 120-day delay began to run on October 17, 
2002. (R.at 74). The 120-day period expired on February 14, 2003. (R.at74). The Trial 
Court relied upon Heaton, and found "administrative errors of state personnel" were not 
grounds for good cause. (R.at2-73). The Court found this case is similar to Heaton in that 
"an administrative error of the warden that extended the, that resulted in the 120 day period 
not running as the statute would require. But that was a very similar case. I'd like the 
findings to reflect that I'm persuaded by Heaton's ruling." (Tr. Volume I of I, Pg. 44-45). 
The trial court refused to find "good cause"; refuting several of the city's arguments. 
The Court ruled "the written demand delivered by the Defendant identified Orem City as a 
prosecuting agency. From the date the warden received it, Orem City had constructive 
knowledge of defendant's arrest and incarceration. The fact the defendant failed to appear 
and was the subject of a bench warrant prior to his incarceration at the prison is simply not 
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relevant to the Court's decision." (R.at 71,72). 
The City argues that Heaton, as well as all other cases in Utah addressing Utah Code 
Ann.§77-29-1, et seq., are not on point and are factually distinguishable. First, cases that 
have addressed Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 have dealt with issues after the appropriate 
prosecuting agency has been given notice. The City of Orem did not receive notice of the 
defendant's arrest nor the written demand for 120-day disposition. Second, the defendant's 
written demand contained factual inaccuracies and/or was incomplete. Third, the time delay 
in bringing the defendant to trial was not caused by the Orem City Attorney's office. Fourth, 
unlike Heaton, where the case was transferred to a different court and the clerk failed to 
schedule a trial within the 120-day requirement, the defendant's case did not "fall through 
a crack in the prosecutor's office, even though the prosecutor's office received Heaton's 
detainer notice"- Orem City never knew the defendant had been arrested on the warrant or 
was incarcerated. 
Furthermore, Heaton does not stand for such a harsh dismissal and as broad of ruling 
as the trial court found. Rather, Heaton does provide courts the freedom to grant an 
extension, even to prosecutors, if good cause can be shown. The Heaton Court hints of 
reasons for the trial court to find good cause to extend the trial outside the 120-day 
requirement by stating "this is not to say that the prosecution must succeed, for 'good cause' 
may support the prosecutor's failure to comply." Id at 916. Also, the Heaton Court spoke of 
an "affirmative duty" to bring the defendant to trial when the prisoner had delivered to the 
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warden the written demand. State v. Heaton, at 915. The Court stated "Implicit in this duty 
is the duty to notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith 
effort to comply with the statute." Id at 915. The issue the Court faced in Heaton focused 
on this affirmative duty imposed upon the prosecution and the "inaction by the prosecution" 
after receiving notice of the 120-day demand for disposition. The Court expressed this 
concern by clarifying "where the prosecutor's failure is inaction - - in this case, doing nothing 
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory period - - the trial court may 
not conclude that the prosecutor's failure is supported by "good cause." In other words 
Heaton only restricts a finding of "good cause" when the prosecution has received actual 
notice (as required by Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2)) coupled with neglecting the notice and 
the affirmative duty through inaction of bringing the defendant to trial within 120 day, even 
for administrative errors of the court, because the burden was on the prosecutor, not the 
court. Heaton is not so far reaching as the trial court presumes. 
In this case, the prosecution would not even be able to comply with the "affirmative 
duty" to notify the court as required in Heaton because the City never received notice. 
Ironically, the warden delivered to the Court, but not the 'appropriate prosecuting agency' 
notice of the detainer request. Thus, Heaton is factually distinguishable and inapplicable 
because Heaton's ruling presumes delivery of the written demand as required in Utah Code 
Ann. §77-29-1(2). Therefore, good cause should be granted and the charges reinstated 
against the defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
the Utah Supreme Court, under Rule 43 of the I Jtah R i lies of \ ppellate procedi ire , for 
immediate transfer for determination and to review and overturn the Supreme Court's rulings 
of Viles and Heaton and interpret Utah Code Ann.§77-29-1 ,et seq. i n a injunction with I Jtah 
Code Ann.§ 7 7-29-5, et seq., and in light of Fex, Crosland, Moore, and the I aylor Courts' 
sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners (in-
state and out-of-state) in the same system and treat the prisoners "side-by-side." If this 
honoi able Coi u tiireli ises to * * aitemati v e , the City of Orem requests this Coi irt 
clarify Viles and Heaton and provide fo< .. "*"ood cai ise" exception as listed i inder §77 29-
l(2)-(3) by rilling the "appropriate prosecuting" attorney must receive actual notice not 
constructive notice based upon the preceding arguments contained in this brief or remand 
vull linn' iitloplinii'i! ol 111« helms listed in llir CIIN \sinn\l li i (in I til n oiiil Imlrleimiin ;: ,IMUI 
cause. 
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ADDEND! TM 1 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review oi 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except Ihe Publu Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of aoencies of political subdivisions oi die suite 
or other local agencies; an. 
(in challenge to agencv action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(cj appeals irom ihc juvenile courts. 
(d) interlocutory appeals from .m; ^ourt of record m u iininal cases, except 
those involving a charge oi a lirsi degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those *< as
 ;i s 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sougm t pc;. -i:-, 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging 
the decisions i the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a 
first degree * capital felony; 
(h) appeals ii\ m district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, oiiiid oustodv, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court, a 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme ( oun. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by Luc vote of four 
judges of the court may certity to the Supreme < ourt for original appellate 
review and determination any mnttor over " !:v- the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Ch ••'.-.• 4<)b. Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
ADDE IN l) i ivf 2 
Rule 43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the 
Supreme Court. 
1. (a) Transfer. In any case over which the Court of Appeals has original 
appellate jurisdiction, the court may, upon the affirmative vote of four >•• '.. __> 
of the court, certify a case for immediate transfer to the Supreme Court for 
determination. 
(h) Procedure loi lianslci. 
(1) The Court of Appeals may, on its own motion, decide whether a case 
should be certified. Any party to a case may, however, file and serve an 
«>neinal and eight copies of a suggestion for certification not exceeding five 
es setting forth the reasons why the party believes that the case should be 
certified. The suggestion may not be filed prior to the filing ola docketing 
statement. Within ten days of service, an adverse party may file and serve an 
original and eight copies of a statement not in excess of five pages either 
supporting or opposing ih«-» su<j<>t^ liot «o» ee'-tiiVntion. 
(I'M pon entry of the oruu ol certification, • icrkof the Court of App^ 
shall immediately transfer the case, including the record and file of the case 
frorh i he trial court, all papers filed in the Court of Appeals, and a w hue-
•ent of all docket entries in the case up to and including the certilicai m 
b the Oerk of the Supreme Court. The Clerk of the Court of \ppeals 
i promptl> notify all parties and the clerk of the trial court that the ease 
nas been transferred. 
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification, the Clerk -a ;U ^upreia « 
shall enter the appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court, i he clerk el u e 
Supreme Court shall immediately send notices to all parties and u -he clerk 
•>1 the trial court that the case has been docketed and that all further filings 
be made with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The notice shall state the 
docket number assigned to the case in the Supreme Court. The case shall 
proceed before the Supreme Court to final decision and disposition as in 
other appellate cases pursuant to these rules. 
^ i i i i lie record on appeal has not been filed with the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial court that upon completion of the 
conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the 
record on appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If. however, the record 
on appeal has already been transmitted to and filed with ihe Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals as of the date of the entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk 
of the Court of Appeals shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court within five days of the date of the entry of the order - -f 
transfer. 
(c) Liueria iui transfer. I he ( win I ul A|>|v;if, J ml I \ WMMIIU V I. itifn.ilinii 
only in the following rases 
(i) Cases which are of such a nature that it is apparent that the case shoulr V 
decided by the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court would proha'M 
grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if decided h\ the (. < >ur oJ 
Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals might rule, and 
(_) L.asct> winv ii will gov* H I number oi other cases involving Uic same legal 
issue or issues pending in the district courts, juvenile courts or the Court of 
Appeals or which are cases of first impression under state or federal law 
which will have wide applicability. 
ADDENDUM 3 
Utah Code Ann. §77-65-l(a)(b) 
"...whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment 
in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever 
during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is 
pending in this state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 
ninety days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the 
county attorney of the county in which the indictment, 
information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court 
written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request 
for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information 
or complaint.... 
(b) the written notice and request for final disposition referred to 
in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to 
the warden, sheriff or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the 
appropriate county attorney and court by registered or certified 
mail, return receipt requested." 
ADDENDUM 4 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be 
granted — Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending 
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and 
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted 
any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
ADDENDUM 5 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into 
law -- Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered 
into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the 
form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
1. ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of 
such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states 
also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when 
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of 
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of Columbia; 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at 
the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant to Article III 
hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated 
pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an 
indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV 
hereof. 
ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or 
correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance 
of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any 
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer 
has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 
days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and 
the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of 
the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be 
made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a 
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on 
which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. 
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of 
the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and 
courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's 
request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by 
the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be 
accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the 
certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint 
contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of 
imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any 
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same 
with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a 
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein 
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the 
receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after 
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for 
final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the 
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in 
order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent 
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance 
with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent 
the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the 
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the 
request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, 
information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner 
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of 
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V 
(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or 
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, 
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted 
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after 
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within 
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request 
for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon 
motion of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) 
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall 
furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under 
which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining 
to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of 
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency 
relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other 
officers and appropriate courts in 
the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with 
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for 
custody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be 
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or 
his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may 
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner 
of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as 
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or 
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint 
contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original 
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the 
court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the 
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary 
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such 
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order 
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final 
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall 
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In 
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state 
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the 
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever 
custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into 
whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the 
basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the 
request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged 
is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV 
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, 
information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing 
the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of 
any force or effect. 
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the 
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one 
or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis 
of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges 
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and 
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be 
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly 
used for persons awaiting prosecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the 
prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is 
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time 
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be 
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of 
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided 
in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the 
custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape 
from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape 
from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to 
this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of 
the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, 
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be 
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring 
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary 
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as 
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed 
to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies 
and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party 
state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities 
therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods 
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time 
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to 
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this 
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 
ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information 
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when 
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may 
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the 
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already 
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes 
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. 
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the 
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability 
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, 
the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to 
any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected 
thereby. If this agreement shall be held 
contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and 
effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters. 
ADDENDUM 6 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
Fourth judicid District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
.^Z^l^LX^. Deputy 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
BRUCE JACKSON, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No. 011404844 
Case No. 025402023 
Assigned Judge: Derek P. Pullan 
Division 10 
These cases came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's 
motion is based upon the failure of Plaintiff Orem City to bring the cases to trial within 120-days 
of the date he delivered to the warden a written demand for final disposition pursuant to section 
77-29-1 of the Utah Code. 
After oral argument, the Court ordered that both cases be dismissed with prejudice and 
directed counsel for Defendant to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law. Counsel for 
Defendant prepared and the prosecutor approved proposed written findings and conclusions 
which were filed with the Court. After reviewing this document, the Court found that it contained 
findings extraneous to the Court's decision and failed to convey fully the legal basis for that 
decision. Therefore, the Court prepared this memorandum decision. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Orem City v. Bruce Jackson, Case Number 01144844 
1. On September 5, 2001, Orem City filed an information charging Defendant Bruce Jackson 
with driving on revocation, open container, and five misdemeanor counts of possession of 
a controlled substance. 
2. Because district court judge in Orem recused himself, the case was transferred to the 
Fourth District Court in Provo and assigned to Judge Lynn W. Davis. 
3. On January 23, 2002, the Court arraigned the Defendant and appointed the Orem City 
Public Defender to represent him. The case was scheduled for pre-trial conference on 
March 5, 2002. 
4. The parties appeared for the pre-trial conference and requested that the case be continued 
for pretrial conference on April 19, 2002. 
5. On April 19, 2002, the Defendant failed to appear. The Court issued a warrant for 
Defendant's arrest. 
6. Four months later, on or about August 19, 2002, the Defendant was arrested on the 
warrant. 
Orem City v. Bruce Jackson, Case No. 025402023 
7. On February 19, 2002, Orem City filed an information charging the Defendant with 
improper left/right turn, and driving on a revoked license. 
8. Because the district court judge in Orem recused himself, the case was transferred to the 
Fourth District Court in Provo and Judge Lynn W. Davis was assigned. 
9. On February 25, 2002, the Court arraigned the Defendant. 
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10. On March 20, 2002, the Defendant failed to appear for further proceedings. The Court 
issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest. 
11. Five months later, on or about August 19, 2002, the Defendant was arrested on the 
warrant. 
The Request for 120-Day Disposition 
12. On September 6, 2002, following his arrest on both warrants, the Defendant was 
sentenced to prison in an unrelated matter. 
13. Three weeks later, the Defendant delivered to the warden a written demand for 120-day 
disposition of untried charges pending against him. 
14. The written demand is dated September 25, 2002. However, the warden certified that it 
was received on October 17, 2002. The form document consists of two pages and bears 
the heading "Division of Institutional Operations Office Memorandum." 
15. The hand-written portion of this document identifies Orem City, Pleasant Grove City, and 
Utah County as relevant prosecuting agencies. The crimes for which Defendant seeks 
disposition are listed as "POSSESSION OF A CONTROLED SUBSTANCE, DRIVING 
ON REVO, POSS. OF C/S. POSS. OF MA." [sic]. 
16. The written demand references four case numbers. It does not list case number 
011404844 or case number 025402023. 
17. The second page of the written demand provides that the Defendant is seeking final 
disposition. It then states that "charges of possession of c/s #985040388 are now pending 
against me in the Provo District Court brought by Utah County and request is hereby 
made that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities together with such 
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information as required by law." 
18. The warden notified the Utah County Attorney's Office by letter dated October 15, 2002 
that the Defendant was requesting final disposition of "untried charges . . . pending in your 
jurisdiction." This letter referenced all four case numbers listed in the written demand and 
identified the crimes as "drive on revocation, poss of C/S 3 cts." [sic]. The letter was 
copied to the Fourth District Court. 
19. The warden did not notify Orem City of the written demand for 120-day disposition of 
pending charges filed by defendant. 
20. The first notice that Orem City had that the Defendant had been arrested on the 
outstanding warrants was on July 22, 2003, the date both cases were scheduled for further 
hearing. 
21. The 120-day period expired on February 14, 2003. 
22. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code. 
23. The Court scheduled a hearing on this motion and trial for November 20, 2003. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail 
or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against 
the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner 
shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the 
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 
days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(1). Once a written demand is delivered, the warden shall "immediately 
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cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, 
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(2). 
Unless good cause exists, the remedy for failure to bring the untried charges to trial within 
the 120-day period is dismissal with prejudice. The statute provides: 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss 
the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure 
of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(4). 
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to dismissal under this statute, the Court 
applies a two-step analysis. First, the Court determines "when the 120-day period commenced 
and when it expired." State v. Coleman, 34 P.3d 790, \ 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Second, "if the 
trial was held outside the 120-day period, [the Court] must then determine whether 'good cause' 
excused the delay." Id 
In the instant case, the 120-day period commenced on October 17, 2002, the date the 
warden certified receipt of Defendant's written demand for final disposition. The 120-day period 
expired on February 14, 2003. Trial was not scheduled until November 20, 2003, the date the 
Court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Orem City contends that the written demand was not legally sufficient because it did not 
accurately identify all the pending charges. The Court rejects this argument. The statute requires 
that the written demand specify "the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending." 
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(1). The Defendant's written demand met these requirements. 
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The charges specified in the demand are driving on revocation and multiple counts of 
possession of a controlled substance. Admittedly, in both pending cases, the demand identifies 
some, but not all of the pending charges. However, section 77-29-1 does not require a precise list 
of untried crimes. Rather, it requires that "the nature of the charge" be specified. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-1(1). For each case, Defendant identified the nature of Orem City's untried charges 
with sufficient clarity to meet the requirements of the statute. 
Orem City also argues that the written demand was without effect because it did not list 
case numbers 011404844 and 025402023. Again, section 77-29-1(1) does not require such 
precision. The demand in this case adequately identified the nature of the pending charges and 
expressly listed Orem City as a prosecuting agency. The constitutional right to speedy trial ought 
not to hinge upon a prisoner's knowledge of a nine-digit case number. 
Because the trial was scheduled outside the 120-day period, the Court must determine 
whether good cause excused this delay. Generally, a finding of good cause means "(1) delay 
caused by the defendant—such as asking for a continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused 
by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial." Coleman, 34 P.3d at 1f 6, quoting, 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1991). Neither of these circumstances are applicable 
here. For this reason and those explained below, the Court concludes that good cause did not 
excuse Orem City's delay in bringing these cases to trial. 
Orem City argues that good cause existed because the City did not in any way contribute 
to the warden's administrative error in failing to provide notice to the City prosecutor. The Court 
rejects this contention. The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that the administrative error 
of a court clerk did not excuse the prosecutor's duty to bring a defendant to trial within the 120-
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day period. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). Writing for a unanimous court, 
Justice Russon wrote: 
We first note that the judge's finding that the State did not contribute to the delay 
carries little significance. The mere fact that the delay was not caused by the 
prosecutor has never been dispositive because "to hold that good cause is 
supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would 
contradict the language in Section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecution. 
Id, citing, State v. Wilson, 453 P.2d 158, 159-60 (Utah 1969). 
The rights afforded a Defendant under section 77-29-1 would have little meaning if 
administrative errors of the warden were an excuse for delay. A prisoner could make written 
demand for final disposition of untried charges in strict accordance with all the requirements of 
law, yet still be tried for those offense years later through no fault of his own. Such a ruling 
would be inconsistent with the language of 77-29-1(4), and would seriously compromise the 
constitutional right to speedy trial. 
Finally, Orem City contends good cause exists because the Defendant failed to appear in 
these cases and a bench warrant issued for his arrest. This event, combined with Defendant's later 
commitment to prison, caused Orem City to be unaware of the Defendant's arrest. In effect, 
Orem City argues that the 120-day period should commence from the date the City received 
actual notice that the Defendant was in state custody. The Court finds this argument without 
merit. 
The plain language of section 77-29-1 provides that the a Defendant must be brought to 
trial "within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice" to the warden. The written 
demand delivered by the Defendant identified Orem City as a prosecuting agency. From the date 
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the warden received it, Orem City had constructive knowledge of Defendant's arrest and 
incarceration. The fact that the defendant failed to appear and was the subject of a bench warrant 
prior to his incarceration at the prison is simply not relevant to the Court's decision. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss both cases with prejudice is 
granted. 
DATED this J ^ P d a y of February, 2004. 
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